COMMON
RESPONSIBILITIES
To Exploit
Uncommon Opportunities
(An
overview of global peace and security in the 21st century)
Jasjit Singh[*]
Nov. 21, 2004
The US State Department’s Report on Global Terrorism 2003 state that 625
people were killed in terrorist attacks worldwide during 2003. But in reality 845
innocents civilian men, women and children were killed in terrorist attacks in
Jammu & Kashmir state in India alone during that year, and nearly 40,000
Brazilians were estimated to have been killed in small arms fire, with as many
as 100,000 people, mostly civilians including women and children, being killed in
the US-led war in Iraq and its aftermath, while sub-Saharan Africa experienced
nearly 2 million deaths due to AIDS-related illness. This denotes the nature as
well as complexities of some of the major challenges facing humanity.
Peace dividend
Many of the optimistic expectations for the future when the great
confrontation ended with the demise of Cold War have not fructified. For
example, the “peace dividend” expected after the end of militarised Cold War
simply did not materialise. On the other hand, global military expenditure has
crossed $1,000 billion. Global arms transfers did come down, but are still
in the range of nearly $29 billion (with 60% going to developing countries) in
2003. There are many reasons for this development contrary to the expectations.
One is that the military expenditure of the USSR was overstated. If we look at
the global military expenditure during the last five or ten years excluding
that of the USSR and its allies and compare it with the data in the five years
after the end of Cold War, one finds that no significant reduction took place
although the Former Soviet Union states were spending far less on their
military forces which themselves were being retrenched.
Second, the end of Cold War witnessed a sudden spurt of Peace Keeping
Operations, mostly undertaken under the UN auspices. But with the US withdrawal
of its contingent from Somalia and the consequent shift in US policy the
frequency of UN Peace Keeping Operations started to come down. At the same
time, such operations started to assume increasing characteristics of “peace
enforcement” rather than the classical peace keeping of earlier times. This was
as much due to the nature of complex tasks facing peace keeping as the nature
of conflicts.
The nature of global security challenges require international
co-operation. This makes it necessary to make an objective assessment of the
nature of the international order to identify the key players who must
co-operate for peace and security in the future. In other words, we need to identify
the players who should work for the international community undertaking common
responsibilities of states, institutions and people to manage global
security challenges. In other words we need to understand the nature of the
international order as it evolves into the future.
International Order in Transition
At the same time there is an increasing acceptance of the idea that
global power is shifting from the West to East after nearly three centuries. This is not so much due to the decline of the
traditional transatlantic powers, but the rise of new power centres like China,
India and recovery of Russia and Japan. This view may be difficult to accept by
those who believe that the world is unipolar and will remain so in the
foreseeable future. But, the so-called “unipolar moment” was just that, a
moment, and ended long ago.
Given the fact that the United States is the sole super power with
unmatched capabilities in military, economic, technological and
political-diplomatic fields, this might appear to be a premature and even wrong
judgement. But the reality has been that there are finite limits to the use of
that power as indeed is clear in the way it has to soft pedal the North Korean (nuclear
weapons) issue, in trying to impose its will on Iran, or battle it out
virtually alone in post-war Iraq. At the same time, the US power has been
magnified by the extensive alliance system that it has headed since the Second
World War. It was inevitable that with the end of Cold War, this alliance would
not carry the same importance as it did earlier because of the mismatch between
the political and military rationale for it in the face of the dissolution of
the enemy. But it certainly has continued to harmonise policies and postures
among themselves thus providing the perception of the leader being even larger
than the reality. The image of “unipolarity,” therefore, has come as much from
the power of the US itself, as from the collective power and influence of the
alliances built around the United States whose members are all the developed industrialised
countries.[1]
But progressively the US-led alliances have been getting less aligned as the
fissures during the lead up to the Iraq War showed, continuing into the
aftermath of the war when even staunch allies like Spain withdrew its forces
from Iraq in spite of the critical shortage of forces to manage the post-war
situation and the pressures to keep the forces who had fought alongside the
US-led coalition forces in March-April 2003.
Alliance members would no doubt support the United States in cases where
the cause is justifiable and legitimate when force is used. In fact the bulk of
the international community would also side with the United States in cases
where the issues are clear and US policy choice is in tune with natural justice
and sensitive to international law and views of other nations as indeed
happened in 1990-91 war against Iraq to liberate Kuwait. But when it came to
the second war against Iraq in 2003 serious dissensions were to be experienced
even among US allies creating rifts that have not healed so far. One may conclude
that support for actions and policies of the most powerful state cannot be
assumed to be automatic, and will also depend upon the perceived interests of
other actors.
If the world is not bipolar, and unipolarity is more an image than
substance, what sort of world are we moving into? The most often described term
is that of an emerging multipolarity. Or at least some of the countries, like
China, Russia, France etc. have been talking and even working toward that end.
The realities on the ground are that new centres of power have been emerging
during the past quarter century or so, while some of the existing centres (like
the Soviet Union/Russian Federation) have shrunk though once again showing
signs of recovery into a new model. This has been acquiring greater salience in
recent years due to the remarkable economic growth in China, India and the
recovery in Russia which would inevitably keep altering the global equations of
power that many countries seek to define in terms of multipolarity. But
multipolarity also implies each of the poles to assume a leadership role in the
region around it. For a variety of reasons, such a situation is unlikely to
become a reality in the foreseeable future.
For example, China, whose rise to power in the past two decades has been
the most dramatic, still carries a
great deal of historical baggage which restricts its ability to assume a
leadership role in Asia. Its search for multipolarity, in fact, is recognition
of this limitation and hence its need to work in co-operation with other major
centres of power while it pursues its own long-term strategic goals. Japan, the
other major power in Asia also carries its own historical baggage that
constrains it to move cautiously and almost gingerly in the exercise of
independent political role leave alone a military responsibility outside its
borders lest it re-ignite the old images of the Samurai and a resurgent
expansionist Japan of the Second World War. Russia is still weak and
debilitated from the socio-economic turmoil of the Soviet collapse and the
legacies of the Soviet era. India has its own historical baggage in terms of
de-industrialisation during the two centuries of colonial rule and the
political-psychological scars it left behind, in addition to the current
challenges of having to go a long way to ensure the requisite level of human
development and domestic peace. The European Union is deeply pre-occupied with
the processes of integration to be able to constitute a pole by itself at this
stage, while some of its individual constituents like France and Germany carry
with them legacies of the past and the obvious contradictions of seeking an
independent role while resolving the tensions of being part of US-led NATO.
What is clear and empirically valid is the reality of new centres of
power rising in the world while many of the old ones are undergoing changes,
qualifying the international order to be designated as moving toward an
increasingly polycentric world. Many of the old norms and paradigms of
arms control, non-proliferation and strategic stability have undergone
fundamental changes. Techno-economic growth is altering the patterns of
interaction that marked most of the 20th century, both before the
Second World War as well as during the decolonisation of the world and the Cold
War. This state of transition would almost inevitably move toward some sort of
an end state over time. And this is why the present period may be seen as the
foreplay of that end-state. What needs to be recognised is that almost all the
new and old centres of power face their own limitations that (severely)
constrain their ability to forcefully shape the policies of the 25 member
European Union and/or the 45-odd Asian countries. The search for a `multipolar’
world is a recognition of these constraints.
Global Power Shift
There is increasing congruence of views among experts that there is a perceptible
global power shift taking place from West to East, especially with the rise of
China and India along with the Russian recovery and Japanese economy starting
to move forward once again. The problem from our perspective is that global
(or even regional) power shifts, when they have occurred in history, have
rarely been peaceful and have often been caused or accompanied by the clash of
arms.
The United States is unquestionably the pre-eminent dominant power in
the world and likely to stay so for the coming decades. But as Brantly Womack
concluded recently, “In the long run it (the United States) cannot succeed in
forcing its will on the rest of the world.”[2]
In fact the process of democratisation of the world is intrinsically linked to
the expansion of the principle and practice of democracy in sovereign states.
Looking at it from a different perspective, Paul Kennedy had hypothesised in
the late 1980s that the United States and the Soviet Union would succumb to the
phenomenon of imperial overstretch and China and Japan would replace them in
the hierarchy of leading powers.[3]
Four years later the Soviet Union proved the thesis right; and the United
States as the sole super power now seems to be overstretched in its
unilateralist imperial mould. The US
National Intelligence Council study on Global Trends 2015 updating the earlier
one had concluded that “There will be increasing numbers of important actors on
the world stage to challenge and check --- as well as reinforce --- US
leadership: countries such as China, Russia, India, Mexico, and Brazil:
regional organisations such as the European Union; and a vast array of
increasingly powerful multinational corporations and non-profit organisations
with their own interests to defend in the world.”[4]
John Mearsheimer had cautioned that ascent of new rival to American
power would start to alter the global strategic balance in a multipolar
multipower world.[5] More recently
Niall Ferguson had argued that the United States suffers from three structural
deficits: (i) its dependence on foreign capital (ii), the deficit of troops
level, and (iii) its attention deficit.[6]
While it must provide the leadership in the emerging de-centralising world
where 3-4 mega-states would contest for power, influence and resources, this is
where the most notable US deficit is.
Other observers are arguing that the “US will not be able to maintain
the dominant power and influence that it has enjoyed since the collapse of the
Soviet Union.”[7] This is not
due to the decline of the United States’ power, but rather due largely to the
rise of other powers. At the same time, in the 18 months since the launching of
the Iraq War, the United States has faced a serious legitimacy problem. As a
consequence of this process, its approval ratings have declined in Europe and
the Muslim world. And yet it needs the co-operation of both if it has to win
the war against terrorism. Under the circumstances the United States is left
with no choice but to seek the co-operation of countries outside of Europe (at
least other than “Old Europe”) and the Muslim world. That is exactly the region
where the new centres of power are rising, where, this would lend strength to the
increasing multipolarity favoured by China, India and Russia.
Unfortunately, the current signs point toward US inability to win the
peace in Iraq. Here lurks a serious problem. Islamic jihad came to believe that
it had defeated the Soviet Union in the 1980s. And if the Mujahideen could
defeat a super power, so went the sentiment, lesser countries like India and
others would not be able to withstand the onslaught of irregular war waged in
the name of religion through non-state actors supported by sub-state
institutions like the intelligence agencies. Islamic jihad erupted across the
world from Chechnya, to Kashmir and all the way to the Philippines finally
coming home to the United States on “nine-eleven.” Here lies another
complication. Terrorist organisations do not have to win from legitimate
governments; they only need to ensure that they are not defeated and that
provides them with the perception of victory especially as long as recruits in
the name of religion are forthcoming from impoverished feudal societies.
Islamic jihad has taken nearly three decades to get to the stage of
“nine-eleven;” and it would take fairly long time for it to be rolled back. And
the United States needs to work closely with the Asian powers and the European
Union to reverse global terrorism if not defeat it. This is most visible in the
quick shift of the Bush administration’s attitude toward China from treating it
as a rival competitor to a cooperating power.
Various studies now clearly indicate that while the United States
remains the largest economy in the world, the next three largest economies in
PPP terms are China, India and Japan. In 2000 RAND updated its 1995 study and
issued a revised report on Asian economic trends and their implications for
security taking data as in September 1999.[8]
Its main conclusions of the trends till 2015 relative to the present
examination can be summarised as follows:
·
China’s economy under the sustained growth
scenario would lead to doubling of GDP by 2015. By that time its GDP would be more
than 3 times that of Japan in PPP terms (only 36 percent in exchange rate
terms). China’s military capital would be 4 times that of Japan in terms of PPP
value (and about the same in nominal exchange rates).
·
Japan’s estimated GDP growth varies from 1 percent
to 1.6 percent per annum. Its military capital stocks would increase from about
$112 billion in 2000 to $119 billion in 2015 (from $154 billion to $166 billion
in exchange rate terms).
·
India’s GDP growth would double between 2000
and 2015 reaching 54 percent of China’s GDP (that is, about 5 percent greater
than its GDP relative to China in 2000). By 2015 RAND estimates India’s
military capital would reach $314 billion, which would be about 62 percent of
China’s $666 billion (compared with only 48 percent in 2000).
What all this (and more) adds up to is that global security issues in
the coming years are going to be far more complex, less easily resolvable, and
above all, depend greatly on international co-operation. James F. Hoge,
Jr., the Editor of Foreign Affairs, cautions that “The transfer of power
from West to East is gathering pace and soon will dramatically change the
context for dealing with international challenges.”[9]
There is every risk that the present international order would, sooner rather
than later, drift toward polarisation with inevitable hegemonism gaining
strength. On the other hand, what the complex global and regional security
issues require for successful handling is a world that is non-polarised,
non-hegemonic and co-operative within a non-hierarchical polycentric
international order. At the same time, multilateral institutions,
especially the UN would need to be rejuvenated and re-aligned with the
consequences of the global power shifts taking place. This is what all
countries, especially the United States, need to be working for in common with
other states if we are to successfully respond to the challenges ahead.
Institutions for Co-operative Peace and Security
It would not be possible to build co-operative peace and security to
deal with the complex and new challenges to global security where most of the
old sources of instability and violence have not disappeared without reshaping
and strengthening global institutions. At the tope of such agenda naturally has
to be the question of rejuvenating the United Nations and the principle and
process of multilateralism.
The United Nations acme into being at the end of World War II reflecting
the international order as it emerged at that time. Profound changes in the
world have already taken place since then, beyond the Cold War that dominated
the decades after 1945 and its subsequent demise. Reforms of the UN, especially
the UN Security Council (which is responsible for managing international peace
and security) have been long overdue. For the UN and its Security Council to
play a meaningful role in the 21st century it is vital that reforms
are not delayed any further. Three central principles should guide the
reshaping of the international institutions:
E
The reformed restructured UN (especially the
Security Council) must reflect the realities of changed international power
structure and its future direction. This would naturally have to take into
account the geopolitical architecture that has been examined in the beginning
of this study indicating the global power shift to Asia.
E
Multilateralism would need to strengthened and
given a fresh impetus. This may even be more difficult than restructuring of
the UN. But that restructuring itself must ensure the revival of
multilateralism.
E
Institutions would need to be tailored for
establishing co-operative peace among states. This would require detailed
studies where a new conceptual framework for inter-state (as well as
intra-state) peace and security is evolved so as to make up for the missed
opportunities of the past and reshape the future through acceptance and
fulfilment of common responsibilities for this task. In turn this would require
strengthening of the nation-states system and their sovereignty rather than
weakening them as has been the case in recent decades.
Domestic Peace and Stability
If we look beyond the
obvious and visible challenges to domestic peace and stability, the issue that
stands out most clearly is that of the pervasive information-cum-communications
revolution that has been sweeping across the world for the past two decades or
more. This has had a profound impact on perceptions of people now connected by
audio-visual communications like the television networks arising out of a new
phenomenon of awareness in society even if people are isolated physically and
located in remote places. Thirty or forty years ago formal education was a
pre-requisite to awareness among people. Formal education is still important
for an increasing number of reasons. But it is no longer a pre-requisite to the
spread of awareness among people. That awareness now comes from the television
screen, mobile cellular phones, greater connectivity through enhanced mobility
and a host of other means and methods made possible by the information revolution.
Commercial advertisements in increasingly free market-oriented societies
further propel awareness and expectations.
This information
revolution, in turn, by rapidly enhancing awareness, has triggered off a global
revolution of rising expectations.
This has its roots in the rising expectations of people based on the new
awareness about a quality of life that is possible, but not necessarily
available in real life. This ranges from awareness of human rights and their
violations, issues of social injustice, economic disparities and
social-economic inequities and a host of differentials in the living conditions
of people, and so on. Increasing sense of inequities along with either lead to
deepening of a sense of relative deprivation. This in turn leads to
frustrations, alienation, and disillusion with the existing order. This sense
of relative deprivation and disillusionment affects the youth the most. In turn
the impatience of the youth, driven by idealism and the desire to change things
for the better, faced with the effects of rising expectations and an increasing
gap between them and the realities of life, resort to violence becomes an
apparently attractive option. This creates a ripe environment for ideologies
and political agendas that seek to exploit the youth and change through
violence.
Weight of historical
evidence informs us that (political-social) revolutions take place during
periods of rising prosperity. Rarely have people rebelled in any significant
manner when weighed down by stark poverty; and there are few incentives to
initiate a violent upheaval during periods of great affluence. The reason is
simple. Periods of rising prosperity are often accompanied by growing
disparities in social and economic terms. This in itself constitutes a destabilising
factor promoting violence.
The first issue then is
that the world needs to recognise that the world is in the middle of a
revolution: the revolution of rising expectations, where a widening gap between
human expectations and the actuality of satisfaction is tending to rapidly foster
and increase political instability and social turbulence. Socio-economic
disparities and inequities provide powerful impetus to increasing sense of
relative deprivation arising from disillusionment. In turn resort to violence to
alter the iniquitous paradigm comes early especially among the youth
(Overwhelming majority of present day terrorists are in the age bracket of
15-28 years). Religion provides a degree of emotional anchor. But when religion
begins to be exploited for political purposes, including motivating and
inciting people to resort to violence in the name of religion, this leads to
serious turbulence in society. This revolution, spurred by the dawn of
information age and the end of Cold War, is undoubtedly at the root of
manifestations of conflict and insecurity, ranging from blatant aggression,
trans-nationalisation of ideological conflict, ethno‑nationalism, religio‑political
radicalism, narco‑ terrorism, to corruption and breakdown of norms and
values of civilised society with expansion of the negative prospect of rising
discontent and socio‑political upheaval.
But there is a positive
side to the revolutions too. And as happens so often, the source of challenge
(information revolution and the revolution of rising expectations) also
contains the seeds of successful antidote to the negative aspects of these
revolutions. Rising expectations and
the thrust for upward socio‑economic mobility are the driving forces for
social change and human development. The revolution of rising expectations,
therefore, offers a great opportunity for moving human development forward at a
faster pace provided social justice and equal opportunities can be provided.
This in itself may require a political vision of the future to be clearly
articulated and pursued. At the same time, information revolution provides a
powerful tool to direct energies toward more constructive activities by
influencing the ideas and attitudes of people.
In short, most of the
current and future challenges to global security arise from the disparities and
inequities which generate instability due to the rising gap between
expectations and realities. Political leadership will have to lay out the
vision and ideologies to provide the direction to this revolution. At the same
time, social justice, enhanced opportunities for gainful employment, removal of
poverty, improved quality of life etc. would all have to be accorded greater
focus and attention.
The New Face of War
The parameters of peace
and security are being altered by the transmutation of conflict: from total and
nuclear war to limited wars, inter‑state wars to intra‑state
conflicts, and regular structured warfare to irregular (low‑intensity)
asymmetric conflicts. Inter‑state war has lost much of its traditional
rationale as an “instrument of policy.” But the overwhelming majority (and some
of the most vicious) of conflicts since World War II have been within
the states, and mostly resulting from ideologies in conflict. During inter‑state
conflicts the State could afford to fight and pursue developmental activities,
and some (as in the case of the United States in World War II) even provided a
boost to economic and industrial growth. But conflicts and violence within
states will adversely affect human development directly.
Society has always been involved in war preparedness and
contributing the means and manpower for war. War, however, had been treated as an
exclusive undertaking of the military. But during the past two centuries,
society has been made increasingly inclusive to war (and conflict). Society
itself became the target in war under the Clausewitzian concept of targeting and
destroying the "will of the nation". Strategic bombing and nuclear
weapons have added an apocalyptic dimension to the (indiscriminate) targeting
of population centres and innocent human beings. At the same time, the
proportion of civilian casualties in wars has increased dramatically. Equally
disturbing but more debilitating is the expansion of violence inside
society for political ends, with or without external linkages. This is one
of the most serious problems of peace and security since it not only undermines
national and international security, but also threatens social peace.
These problems are being seriously aggravated because the spread
of violence within society. The State has been rapidly losing its
traditional monopoly over instruments of violence. Highly powerful and
lethal weaponry, normally classified as "small arms and light weapons,"
is available in increasing quantities and technological sophistication to non‑state
actors. Small arms proliferation (SAP) is already proving to be the most
destabilising factor in the security of states and societies. This proliferation now poses greater dangers
than even nuclear proliferation, because nuclear weapons may or may not ever be
used, but “small” arms and light weapons are being used everyday in the world's
three‑dozen ongoing wars and in scores of other states and societies.
Unfortunately, little
attention has been focused on this cancerous growth. While the UN has finally
taken cognisance of the problem, it still seems to be tied down to the approach
to work along the least common denominator of policy in addressing the issues. One
of the central problems is that most expert focus tends to address the problem
of spread of small arms and light weapons within the framework of conventional
arms trade and transfer framework. But the problem is that small arms are
legitimate instruments with the military and security forces of countries. The
problem is their diffusion to non-state actors and general spread into society,
both as a natural phenomenon of the debris of the Cold War and its proxy wars
(like Afghanistan, Somalia, Angola etc.).
On the other hand, many states have actively pursued a conscious policy
of SAP as an instrument of their own policies and objectives, mostly through
sub-state agencies and non-state actors and groups. Small arms proliferation,
linked to other factors promoting conflict, like ideology, narcotics‑trafficking,
terrorism, etc., threatens to seriously undermine human development.
One of the common
responsibilities of the international community is to reverse the spread of
small arms and light weapons into society. Some of the key policy options to do
so are listed below:
E
Enhanced awareness and understanding of the
phenomenon and consequences of the spread of light weapons into society outside
legitimate control of the State.
E
Deligitimisation of targeting civil society and
innocents, especially through terrorist violence. Changes in the belief systems
and attitudes that have sought to legitimise targeting of civil society with
lethal weapons and advocate use of terror as a weapon. Eradication of terrorism
and doctrines that promote the use of terror as a legitimate weapon for
political ends.
E
Stop the movement of light weapons (especially
those manufactured to military specifications and for the use of military/armed
police forces) from under State control to outside its direct physical control.
Inventories of arms with military/armed police to be strictly controlled.
E
Ban the possession of weapons of
military-specification by non-state actors and groups or individuals. The ban
will need to be rigidly enforced. Recover/revert arms outside governmental
control to bring them under strict government control.
E
Declare the supply of weapons of military
specifications to non-state actors/groups or individuals as an international
crime.
E
Control of trans-border movement of light
weapons to ensure they remain within the jurisdiction of the State. Control and
eliminate illicit trade and transfer of light weapons.
E
Enhanced awareness and understanding of the
phenomenon and consequences of the spread of light weapons into society outside
legitimate control of the State.
E
Tighter control over narcotics manufacture and
trade, and money laundering. Narcotics production and trade to be treated as a
challenge to international peace and security.
E
Control of crime and criminal activities, both at
national and transnational levels. The UN has initiated steps through its
resolution which need universal adherence to control transnational criminal
activities.
E
Tighter control over narcotics manufacture and
trade, and money laundering. Narcotics production and trade to be treated as a
challenge to international peace and security.
The central goal of the first step would be to institute a Convention
prohibiting illicit manufacture and transfer of small arms and light weapons
(including ammunition etc.). The OAS convention is a useful guide for this
purpose. More extensive measures will be necessary if effective control over
transnational movement of light weapons is to be ensured. Such a convention,
however, would be a useful reinforcing step to the initial commitment to bring
all small arms within governmental control. Unfortunately the United States has
not ratified the OAS Convention still seven years after it was signed by it.
Similarly, US laws to ban assault weapons instituted in 1994 expired this year
without being renewed by the Bush administration thus giving the process of
control of sophisticated weapons in society a serious setback.
Terrorism and its Strategic Context
The issue of global security uppermost in the minds of people across the
world is that of global terrorism and the US-led war against it since
“nine-eleven.” While terrorism per se is not a new phenomenon in human history,
what the world is experiencing is a transformed framework for the type of
terrorism that has transnational connections at one level, and is driven by
religion-based extremist-radical ideologies at another, while some states have
adopted the use of terror as an extension of politics by other means. Globalisation
of economy, communications, financial flows, flow of illicit weapons, and crime
has facilitated the globalisation of terrorism, its supporting
infrastructures, often employing normal channels and resources like banking
etc. These developments, by definition, require international co-operation if
global trends in terrorism are to be arrested and reversed.
The State has been losing its traditional monopoly over the instruments
of violence. During the Cold War the super powers pursued the policy of
diffusing sophisticated weapons (like hundreds of force structure, highly
lethal Stinger surface-to-air missile to Mujahideen non-state actors fighting
in the name of religion in Afghanistan) this as part of their strategy for
mutual dominance. Afghanistan was the classic example where clandestine warfare
under the banner of religious jihad was promoted by the United States (and
Pakistan, though for different reasons) encouraging the spread of weapons,
narcotics and violence into society in the name of jihad. The debris of Cold
War has further eroded the control of the State over weapons.
Terrorism is shifting from its traditional political orientation to
religious-ideology driven violence. Compared to their near absence three
decades ago, today religious groups constitute over two-third of the
militant/terrorist entities in the world. Ideological reasons had driven the
Cold War and its hot segment, the proxy wars. Toward the end of Cold War
religion was increasingly exploited for political and ideological purposes in
Afghanistan to provide motivation for war and violence. The nearly two‑decade war in Afghanistan was fuelled and sustained
by ideological factors ‑‑ domestic, regional, and global. Religion
is coming to play an increasing role in politics even in states that have
pursued liberal democratic or socialist ideologies. International security is
consequently affected seriously, because "...the combination of religion
and politics is potentially explosive. The combination of religion and
nationalism is stronger, but a blend of the three has an extremely destructive
potential."[10]
Distinction between domestic terrorism and international terrorism has
been diffusing due to greater external involvement in internal terrorist
violence in a country. Today there is hardly any significant domestic armed
conflict that does not actively receive political support, weapons, serious
financial assistance and safe havens beyond the borders where terrorist acts
are committed. The US war against terrorism had stalled nearly a year after it
was initiated as a consequence of “nine-eleven.” The Taliban regime was removed
from Kabul, but it quickly found refuge in Pakistan. Al Qaeda infrastructure
has been severely dented; but Osama bin Laden and a large segment of Al Qaeda
leadership is still free and inspiring if not guiding terrorist operations. US
shift of focus on Iraq and the subsequent war and managing its aftermath not
only resulted in reduced focus on terrorism but actually permitted the Al Qaeda
to diffuse into foreign lands. According to an expert analysis in the US Army, “The global war on terrorism as presently
defined and conducted is strategically unfocused, promises much more than it
can deliver, and threatens to dissipate U.S. military and other resources in an
endless and hopeless search for absolute security. The United States may be
able to defeat, even destroy, al-Qaeda, but it cannot rid the world of
terrorism, much less evil.”[11]
Changes in the belief systems and attitudes that have sought to
legitimise targeting of civil society with lethal weapons and advocate use of
terror as a weapon. Eradication of terrorism and doctrines that promote the use
of terror as a legitimate weapon for political ends requires fundamentally
different sets of ideas and belief systems compared to those that legitimise
use of violence against innocents. Counter-terrorism is absolutely essential to
rolling back and eliminating terrorism. But by itself it is not likely to
achieve desirable results without energetic efforts to alter the ideas and
belief systems that provide the foundations for modern terrorism. This would
require:
- Delegitimisation
of use of terror as an instrument of policy. This has to be built on the
foundation of reversing the two-decade legitimisation of targeting and
indiscriminate killing of civilians and innocents.
- Addressing
the phenomenon caused by the revolution of rising expectations through
appropriate ideology. This requires removing the inequities and
disparities in society while ensuring faster human development.
- Restoring
religion to its moral-ethical social role rather than as an instrument of
politics and political goals.
- Ensuring
that the process of nation-state building is accorded the highest
priority.
- Cleaning
the complex debris of the Cold War on priority.
One of the essentials for reducing violence in states and by them in and
outside states is to promote and strengthen the principles of working
through consultative processes based on the ideology of equality of the human
being. This is normally interpreted in terms of democracy. But there are
many facets to democracy and electoral processes by themselves cannot
automatically provide the consultative doctrines without the ideology of
equality seeping deep down into the cultural roots of people.
At the core of the battle of ideas what is required is the pursuit of
the philosophy of non-violence as the vehicle for resolving differences and
disputes. This itself demands institution and strengthening of consultative
culture and democracy. It is generally believed that democracies don’t go to
war with each other. But empirical evidence demonstrates that the democratic
dispensation extends its influence far beyond just wars between states. For
example, democratic societies indulge in far less violence against their own
populations compared to authoritarian states (see Figure 1)
Source: Based on data from RJ Rummel, Power
Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence, New Jersey, 1997.
Similarly democratic governments indulge in violence outside the state
far less often that other forms of governance and ideologies (See Figure 2).
Source: Based on data from RJ Rummel, Power
Kills: Democracy
as a Method of Nonviolence, New Jersey, 1997.
Counter-terrorism obviously must proceed with focus and energy to
dismantle infrastructure, organisations, sanctuaries and support systems of
modern terrorism. But what we need to ask ourselves is whether winning the
counter-terrorism battles would lead to winning the war against terrorism?
Would terrorism against the United States and its allies end with the
decimation of Al Qaeda?
The reality is that what Al Qaeda, Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Jaish e-Muhammad
etc. represent are not just distinct terrorist organisations, but a movement
that seeks to inspire and coordinate other groups and individuals, often with
no direct contact between them except the ideological foundations driving the
resort to indiscriminate use of violence for what the perpetrators believe to
be a “noble” cause and duty. Counter-terrorism is essential to rolling back and
eliminating terrorism. But it not likely to achieve desirable results without
energetic efforts to alter the intellectual foundations, the ideas and belief
systems that provide the foundations for modern terrorism. This would require:
- Delegitimisation
of use of terror as an instrument of policy and reverse the two-decade
legitimisation of targeting and indiscriminate killing of civilians and
innocents.
- Addressing
the phenomenon caused by the revolution of rising expectations through
appropriate ideology. This requires removing the inequities and
disparities in society while ensuring faster human development.
- Strengthening
the ideology of equality of the human being and provide robust support to
the spread of democratic principle and practice.
- Restoring
religion to its moral-ethical social role rather than as an instrument of
politics and political goals.
- Ensuring
that the process of nation-state building is accorded the highest
priority.
- Cleaning
the complex debris of the Cold War on priority, especially the spread of
(military-specification) small arms and light weapons in society.
Dangers of Nuclear Weapons
Contrary to the expectations a decade ago, the salience of nuclear
weapons has, if anything, increased. With the US reversal in opting for renewed
emphasis on nuclear weapons even in contingencies against non-nuclear
adversaries, the prospects of controlling nuclear weapons are receding.
The adoption of the resolution on Principles and Objectives during the
NPT extension conference itself reaffirms the commitment of Article VI of NPT
to negotiate the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The World Court
ruling of July 1995 had categorically ruled unanimously that “There exists an
obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations
leading to nuclear disarmament in all aspects under strict international
control.”[12] All the
nuclear weapon states, declared and undeclared, have at various times
articulated their support for total nuclear disarmament. The G-21 resolution
specifically seeks tangible progress on nuclear disarmament. The NPT Review
Conference had adopted a 13-point agenda to move toward nuclear disarmament.
Unfortunately, more than four years later, little progress on any of the thirteen
points has taken place.
Abolishing nuclear weapons require an approach to the issues based on
concurrent definitive movement along a number of mutually reinforcing and
converging pathways that seeks to
E
Establish a process of de-legitimisation of nuclear
weapons so as to make nuclear weapons redundant and unusable,
E
Progressively narrow the scope and envelope of
the role and deployment of such weapons,
E
Achieve deep reductions down to zero levels,
and evolve an international security framework for a post-nuclear weapon world.
Given the complexities of elimination, the starting point should be a
re-affirmation of the intent to eliminate nuclear weapons at the earliest, and
to make concerted efforts “in good faith” to achieve the goal of a nuclear
weapon free world.
De-legitimisation
of Nuclear Weapons
All real changes in
human history have come about as a result of force of ideas. It is necessary,
therefore, that elimination of nuclear weapons also seeks to alter the belief
system and ideas that have sought to justify nuclear weapons. The process of
such change and de-legitimisation will have to based on three concurrent
measures.
Binding Declaration of
Intent
Although there are
many treaties, agreements, communiqués, and declarations supporting the goal of
elimination, especially as a long-term objective, it would be useful at this
stage to restate the objective of total elimination and prohibition of nuclear
weapons. As General Lee Butler states, “A clear and unequivocal commitment to
elimination, sustained by concrete policy and measurable milestones, is
essential to give credibility and substance to this long-standing declaratory
position”.[13] Declaration
along the above lines needs to be made essentially by the five declared and the
three undeclared nuclear weapon states. The three (India, Israel, and Pakistan)
are not members of the NPT and, it can be argued, are not bound as yet by any
formal commitment to elimination. It would, therefore, be desirable to get them
committed to the process and goals of elimination. The non-nuclear weapon
states parties to the NPT have already foregone their right to acquire nuclear
weapons, and are committed to Article VI of the NPT. It has also been suggested
that Japan and Germany, as major non-nuclear weapon countries, should also be
included among states that should carry primary responsibility for ensuring
elimination along with the other eight.[14]
Creating a Legal Norm
The World Court has ruled that there is no specific law that declares
nuclear weapons as illegal, although their use would be generally inconsistent
with rules of armed conflict and humanitarian laws. It is necessary, therefore,
that an appropriate legal norm be established on the road to total elimination
of nuclear weapons. This is best achieved through a convention to outlaw the
use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. Such a convention could be modelled
on the 1925 Geneva Convention, and could even, initially, allow the right of
use in self-defence as long as the principle of proportionality is observed.
A resolution to this effect has been moved and passed with majority vote
at the UN General Assembly regularly since 1978. The interest of some of the
key players that pressed for such a convention earlier appears to have flagged
somewhat. But if the goal of elimination of nuclear weapons is to be translated
into reality, it would be necessary to establish the norms and legal framework
that alters the legitimacy and the mindset that believes in the utility and
usability of such weapons.
No-First-Use
Commitment
Doctrinal changes in the use and utility of nuclear weapons is another
aspect of the process of de-legitimisation. There is an urgent need for a
binding political agreement among the eight declared/undeclared nuclear weapon
states (five weapon states, and India, Pakistan and Israel) not to be the first
to use nuclear weapons/capabilities. Of these, China and India have always
supported the concept of no-first-use pledge. The Soviet Union used to support
the concept also, but the Russian Federation has moved away from that position.
However, it is not an absolutist shift. Last year Russia and China agreed to a
bilateral no-first-use (of nuclear weapons) commitment within a broader
non-aggression pact. In a profound change from its earlier position, NATO
adopted the position in July 1990 that nuclear weapons were “truly weapons of
last resort”. The new Strategic Concept adopted by NATO in November 1991
further relegated nuclear weapons to margins of NATO strategy by stating that
the “circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be
contemplated” are “remote”.[15]
The new NATO-Russia Founding Act signed at Paris on May 27, 1997, states
that “Russia and NATO do not see each other as adversaries”. President Clinton,
speaking about the Charter stated that “The veil of hostility between East and
West has lifted. Together we see a future of partnership too long delayed that
must no longer be denied.” President Chirac of France and Chancellor Kohl of
Germany endorsed these views. There is every reason to expect, therefore, that
NATO should move at early date from its current “last resort” position.
Narrowing
the Envelope
Progressive constriction of the envelope of nuclear weapons
in terms of the role and deployment is necessary. Given the reality of a
dramatically altered geo-political landscape, this should be based on three
concrete measures.
De-activate
Arsenals
Declaratory commitment should include announcement followed by action
placing nuclear arsenals off alert, and de-targeting of other countries. This
would be a strong measure of reassurance of security of other countries,
whether they are nuclear weapon states or not. At the recent NATO-Russia
summit, president Yeltsin announced unilaterally that “Russia was going to
remove the warheads from the nuclear missiles” that it has continued to target
on countries of NATO.[16]
The goal apparently was to de-target NATO countries. Russia already has a 1994
agreement with the United States not to target each other’s country with
nuclear arsenals. The present Russian proposal would extend that unilaterally
to other NATO countries.
We are closer to an accepted norm of deactivating arsenals than what is
generally recognised. NATO and Russia have agreed not to target each other.
Russia and China have also an understanding wherein their weapons do not target
each other. The only set of nuclear weapon states that still have their
arsenals targeted at each other are the United States and China. This would
suggest that while the problem of greater co-operation among NATO and Russia on
measures to move toward elimination is techno-economic, the problem between
China and the United States is much more fundamental pertaining to political
and strategic goals of the two countries. One approach to reduce the
political strategic divergence between these two countries is for the United
States and China to undertake reassurance by agreeing to a no-first-use
commitment in respect of nuclear weapons at least against each other to
start with. This will also have a very positive impact on the overall situation
in Asia, where many people are beginning to wonder whether an incipient Cold
War has already commenced between the two great powers, China and United
States.
Separation of warheads from delivery systems is a logical progression to de-targeting of
nuclear weapons against each other’s territories. Removal of warheads from
delivery systems offers the most viable, least costly, and most re-assuring
interim step. In fact, if accepted in principle by the declared weapon states,
this offers the quickest method of reducing the risks associated with nuclear
weapons, and enables a more equitable reliable transitional security
arrangement.
Control
and Reverse the Nuclear Arms Race
There are a number of indications that nuclear arms race is starting in
qualitative terms. This is in contradiction with the goal of elimination of
nuclear weapons.
Long-range delivery systems like ballistic missiles and strategic bombers extend the envelope of use
and threat of nuclear weapons. They bring an increased number of countries even
far away, within the range of the weapons carried. Ballistic missiles, in
particular are highly destabilising because of their short time of flight, high
re-entry speeds and steep re-entry trajectories which combine to make credible
defence against them extremely difficult, if not impossible at present. Two
steps are required so that delivery system remain an integral part of the
elimination of nuclear weapons as much as they have been in their existence and
strategy:
-Expand the INF Treaty abolishing land-based ballistic missiles of USA
and USSR/Russia to include missiles with ranges between 50-5,500 kilometres and
involving all countries of the world.
-Negotiate a global treaty to abolish all ballistic missiles, and place
all space launch capabilities and activities under international safeguards.
Nuclear Weapons Convention
The convergent roads to the ultimate goal of elimination of nuclear
weapons will need to negotiate a convention for the abolition of nuclear
weapons which, like the Chemical Weapons Convention, prohibits production,
possession, and use of nuclear weapons. There are four plausible options in
concluding such a convention.
A conventional war between states has already become extremely costly
and unaffordable. Unlike the Second World War, use of conventional weapons, for
example, in Europe, could lead to hundreds of Chernobyl and Bhopal-type
tragedies. For the developing countries also the cost is unbearable since it
would retard their development by decades as the case of Iraq clearly proves.
In any case, prevention of war rests on conventional deterrence rather than
nuclear weapons. The longer we stay with the logic of nuclear deterrence, the
greater are the risks of proliferation.
Post-nuclear security must address the problem of breakout and a country
clandestinely acquiring nuclear weapons even if highly intrusive and effective
inspection and verification measures (like in the Chemical Weapons Convention)
are incorporated in a Nuclear Weapons Convention. The logical approach to an
insurance measure under this situation would be an international (residual)
nuclear deterrent force. Even if such a force were under the joint control of
the current five nuclear weapon states, it would eliminate risks and threats
emanating from national arsenals and provide the requisite deterrence.
At the same time it is necessary to shift inter-state security paradigm
from the traditional competitive model to a more co-operative framework. This
will require an ever-increasing level of co-operation with potential
adversaries and antagonists. Certain level of such co-operation had existed
even among the great powers at the peak of the Cold War confrontations. The
process needs to be given a conceptual framework and impetus to serve the needs
of the 21st century. The 20th century has been human
history’s most violent century. The primary lesson of that century is the need
for making the current century not only less violent, but a century of peace.
Elimination of nuclear weapons is an essential ingredient of that process.
Missile Defences
An objective examination indicates that the threat of ballistic missile
proliferation (BMD) is grossly overstated. The second fundamental issue is that
missile defences would not eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons and their
use. On the contrary, they are likely to increase that risk, either through
greater scope for miscalculation of the adversary’s intentions, or through
failure of the missile defence shield. BMD, even if fool-proof and affordable,
could only negate one type of delivery system. Nuclear weapons could still be
delivered by aircraft and/or cruise missiles (the most likely means of delivery
in developing countries). Countries are bound to adopt counter-BMD strategies
that range from increasing the number of attacking missiles to saturate the
defences (and hence trigger a new arms race), new technological solutions, or
seeking asymmetric approaches to compensate for missile defences.
Technological developments are already promising to make BMD less than
effective instrument of defence. Research and development in Trans Atmospheric
Vehicles and hyper-velocity manoeuvring systems has already demonstrated
success last February which led Russia to claim that its manoeuvring warhead
would defeat any and all missile defences. A month later the US announced the
successful test of the X-43A hyper-velocity vehicle capable of manoeuvring in
lower space-upper atmosphere. China is believed to be working on similar
systems. These developments would not only negate the effectiveness of missile
defences, but have already triggered a new arms race, besides the one already expanding
into the militarization and weaponisation of space due to BMD and autonomous
momentum of future military technological advances.
Use of ballistic missiles has not taken place against a developed
industrialised country since the Germans fired their missiles in World War II.
But this does not imply that it cannot happen in future. The most profitable
course of action open to the international community is that of universal
missile disarmament. It could commence with the universalisation of the INF
Treaty. Space programmes could then be pursued for peaceful purposes under an
international inspection-verification regime.
BMD will erode nuclear deterrence (through punishment) as it has come to
be recognised; and credibility in nuclear deterrence, therefore, will also
erode. BMD implicitly conveys the message that the US now leans towards the
view that non-BMD nuclear deterrence (conventional or otherwise), especially
against a rogue state, will not work in future. This obviously undermines
existing treaties and opens up the potential for other states to legally
withdraw or circumvent their commitments to international norms, regimes, and
treaties. The CTBT and MTCR may be the early casualties. Above all, as the
lesson of history points out, success of BMD will lead to alternate approaches
including shifting conflict to altogether different planes to apply violence
where it is seen as necessary and providing a payoff. And all indications are
that armed conflict will tilt further in the direction of irregular wars and
unconventional methods of applying force. Transnational terrorism stands out as
a prime candidate for such strategies; and it is likely that the risks of
nuclear terrorism, especially sponsored by states (rogue or otherwise) will
increase.
Following the same logic, it is conceivable that a nuclear weapon state
may find it advantageous to transfer nuclear weapons and/or technology to
another state to cope with the challenges posed by BMD. This is even more
relevant in the context of nuclear weapon states so vehemently opposing nuclear
disarmament, even in principle. Proxy wars with small and light weapons in the
territories of the developing world had become a frequent phenomenon during the
Cold War because the costs and effects of direct confrontation were
prohibitive. At this point it may be difficult to visualise proxy wars with
nuclear weapons and technologies; but the recent trends that came to light
about nuclear proliferation from Pakistan point toward that direction. On the
other hand use of sub-conventional war including transnational terrorism would
provide an attractive option to countries to conduct asymmetric warfare against
powerful states armed with missiles, missile defences and high levels of
conventional capabilities.
The central question is that will missile defences stabilise great power
strategic balance? Unfortunately there is little to suggest that this is likely
to happen. What is more likely is the impetus to polarisation that missile
defence issue will provide. Since there are greater potential for instability
between the US and China, and the latter has already adopted an adversarial
position on the subject linking it to strategic stability and the future of
arms control, the potential for polarisation is increasing. The shift of
strategic axis from Washington-Moscow to Washington-Beijing would have its own
implications for security and stability in Asia. The future of strategic
stability in Asia will depend upon whether ballistic missile defences provide
stability in the relations between China and the United States or not.
Future of Arms Control
Arms control have been one of the important components of establishing
strategic stability and reducing the risks of arms race, use of military power
and managing the dangers emanating from possession and deployment of nuclear
weapons. Unfortunately, current trends indicate that the future of arms
control, especially those necessary in a multilateral context, is bleak.
The most significant (and successful) multilateral arms control measures
during the past six decades has been those under “non-proliferation” especially
of weapons of mass destruction and related capabilities like long-range
(ballistic and cruise) missiles. A series of such measures have been negotiated
and formalised in the shape of treaties of which the NPT stands out. Other
measures (like the Australia Group concerning chemical weapons, MTCR, NSG
Guidelines, Wassenaar arrangement, etc.) have been instituted through ad-hoc
limited membership. However multilateral treaties have also been negotiated for
complete disarmament as in the case of Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This has also led to continuing tussle
among nations to institute arms control measures with a balance of obligations
between non-proliferation and disarmament, the two facets of arms control. The
developed industrialised states have sought to restrict and limit the
acquisition of military capabilities by other nations even where they were not
hostile or posed a threat to them individually or collectively under the rubric
of non-proliferation. The developing countries have traditionally pressed for
universal disarmament measures as the preferred arms control objective not
necessarily with success. The five nuclear weapon states have pressed for
(geographically) limited disarmament through NWFZ (Nuclear Weapon Free Zones)
without accepting any limits on their own nuclear weapons deployment etc. in
those zones. The NPT represents the prime example of this tussle.
After a short-lived spurt in the early 1990s,[†]
multilateral institutions have continued to atrophy since the end of Cold War.
The UN Conference on Disarmament, the primary institution for negotiating
multilateral arms control has been progressively and increasingly deadlocked to
proceed with negotiation process leave alone conclude treaties even in case
where clear mandate from the dominant powers and the UN General Assembly has
existed (as in the case of Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty). Most of the arms
control to support non-proliferation goals have been negotiated or concluded
piece-meal outside the multilateral institutions and through ad-hoc groupings.
Typical examples have been the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime
beyond the NPT and without its commitments for disarmament (Article VI) as well
promotion of nuclear technology and its availability for peaceful purposes
(Article IV).
The United States, in spite of its role as the primary driver of arms
control in the world, has had a record of stepping back from its commitments
even in case of agreements and treaties that it vigorously sought to promote.
In the opinion of one of the most perceptive experts in the field, Dr. Steven
E. Miller, the “United States has rejected, repudiated, blocked, ignored, or
refrained from joining a long and by now familiar list of treaties and agreements.”[17]
By 2001 only START-I remained out of earlier arms control agreements. While it
pressed for a Chemical Weapons Convention and signed it in 1993, when it
ratified the convention, it laid down nearly two dozen conditions which would
dictate its actual adherence. Its enthusiastic support for a CTBT
(Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) led to its signature to the treaty in 1996 when
it was opened, but it has failed to ratify it since then with the result that
the treaty continues to be in a state of coma with little prospects of recovery
since the US was part of the group of states that mandated (under Article 14 of
the treaty) that all 44 countries capable of conducting a nuclear test must be
parties before the CTBT could enter into force. Its own powerful position in
today’s world has not even permitted a meeting of the parties to the treaty to
be called (by 1999) to “discuss measures” for its implementation. The US has
repudiated its earlier commitment to sign the draft verification protocol to
the Biological Weapons Convention declaring it as “dead, and (is) not going to
be resurrected” leaving it as weak as ever.[18]
The problem is not just that of Bush administration and the
neo-conservative attitudes. For example, the United States had finally joined the
Geneva Convention of 1925 banning the threat and use of chemical weapons
(without actually requiring their elimination or even control) a full half
century after the convention was signed. Even during the Clinton presidency
which looked at arms control with a much more benign eye, no new arms control
agreements were initiated and the TMD demarcation agreement was not even
submitted to the Senate. Its refusal to join the International Criminal Court
is in tune with the jettisoning of multilateralism. The US signed the OAS
Convention on controlling small arms in 1997 but has not been willing to ratify
it. US commitment to the thirteen steps agreed upon (including on nuclear
disarmament) at the NPT Review Conference in 2000 is a case in point. Its
recent willingness to conditionally enter into negotiations on the stalled FMCT
appear to be motivated more as concession to the forthcoming NPT Review
Conference in 2005 rather than a serious attempt at seeing the FMCT through
although this is one of the major non-proliferation measure to control nuclear
fuel cycle in future especially to reduce the risk of such material getting
into the hands of terrorist groups.
It is perhaps useful to quote Dr. Miller at some length on the common
core belief in Washington policy circles that “arms control is not particularly
effective…. That it (arms control) is unreliable in coping with the hard (and
most important) cases.” That “some believe that arms control has been a
failure, raising substantial costs and risks while providing little benefit and
offering few real successes.” Others believe that “arms control has been
downright counterproductive, imposing undesirable constraints, enshrining
misguided ideas, and creating the unfortunate illusion that something serious
was being done about important security issues.”[19]
Other countries are bound to follow the unilateralist approach to arms that the
US has adopted. Under the circumstances, it would not be easy to achieve
strategic stability and risk reduction in future.
Building
Co-operative Peace and Security
A competitive paradigm of international
security has been in existence for more than three centuries. The shift from
dynastic kingdoms to nation-states since the 17th century has also led to the
emergence of a competitive paradigm of inter-state security. The concept of
sovereign state, with the inevitable ego-centred state system at its base,
implies building up state security to the maximum possible limits. This has
actually tended to push nations to seek security at absolute levels. In turn,
this inevitably generates threat perceptions in other countries, who, being
sovereign states themselves, and then seek national security at ever higher
levels. An implicit and explicit competition for achieving a higher level and
assurance of security between states gets established.
Competition among states has become an
established phenomenon as a result of social, political, economic, and
technological competition among people, societies, and states. The competitive
paradigm of security has intensified over the centuries, reaching new
dimensions with the introduction of nuclear weapons into security equations.
The primary reasons for this process may be summed up as follows:
1. Sovereign nation state system in the 20th
century emphasised national
sovereignty and security to a much greater level than before.
2. Ideological competition provided a sharp
competitive edge.
3. Speeding up of the effects of Industrial
Revolution due to technological
competition and potential superiority in the application of force
offered by superior military technology.
4. Free market economies built on the principle
of competitive advantage.
5. Democracy encourages competitive politics,
especially when it is still fragile.
Serious thought must be
given to the question whether the competitive security paradigm has provided
greater potential for security or not. The consequences of competitive security
paradigm include:
1. Increase in the sense of insecurity of
states because of the pressure of the drive toward absolute security by a
sovereign state.
2. Vulnerability becomes an integral component
of strategic stability under a competitive security paradigm. Security is built
on generating and sustaining insecurity, at times, in profoundly threatening
ways. Doctrines of aggressive maximum nuclear deterrence seek to
institutionalise vulnerability.
3. Open-ended arms race, especially among
hostile pairs of states (and their allies). A concurrent consequence is the
high levels of military spending and militarization of states and societies.
This in turn results in disproportionate amounts of resources being allocated
to military means of security, often at the cost of more fundamental elements
of security needs.
4. Politico-military doctrines tend to be built
on worse-case scenarios and the principle that “offence is the best means of
defence”, raising the risks and incidence of wars and armed conflicts.
5. Competitive security paradigm intrinsically
encourages militarization of inter-state relations, and encourages hegemonism
with states seeking to dominate/control the security environment.
The search for a new paradigm of inter-state
security for the 21st century can best be initiated by an examination of the
existing framework of collective security. The roots of collective security can
be traced to the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) which obligated all its
signatories “to defend and protect all and every article of the peace against
anyone .... and to join the injured party, and assist him with counsel and
force to repel the injury.” In more recent times, the principle was enshrined
in the Covenants of the League of Nations (especially Article 16, besides
Articles 10 and 11). The failure of the League of Nations (primarily because of
strategic and national interests of sovereign member states ) to maintain
international peace and security, and the Second World War led to the
establishment of the United Nations as the new peace organisation. The record
of the UN over the last half-century has been mixed. The single most important
factor that came in the way has been the issue of sovereignty of the
nation-state system. The UN has relied more on collective defence rather than
collective security. This is why the mechanisms visualised in the Charter for
the implementation of Chapter VII provisions were never really instituted.
Collective security should logically be defined
in universal terms. For application of collective security principle to the
United Nations, it is clear that all members of the international body would be
included in the framework of collective security. In such a case, collective
security would be “the guarantee of the territorial integrity and independence
of each state by all states” (as defined in the Dictionary of Political Science, New York, 1964). On the other
hand, a less than universal principle has sought to be used in many cases. For
example, Hans Morgenthau defined the organising principle of collective
security as a “moral and legal obligation to consider an attack by any nation
upon any member of the alliance as an attack upon all members.” (Politics Among Nations). But this should
logically be termed as collective defence.
Co-operative peace
and security
There is a view that national sovereignty is an
outdated concept. The move toward increasing integration of the European Union
certainly endorses this perception. On the other hand, the (sovereign) nation
state system is the only viable framework for organisation. In fact, most of
the countries of the developing world are engaged in the process of
nation-state building, and the preservation of the principle and practice
(within liberal interpretations) of sovereignty is critical for this process.
The concept of international security and its operationalisation has to be
based on the prevailing system of international organisation. The issue,
therefore, is not so much a question of dilution or removal of sovereignty, but
more of harmonising the contradictions of sovereignty directing national
security and building international peace and security on more durable, less
threatening foundations. This can be achieved by a conceptual shift from a
paradigm of competitive security in existence for centuries to that of co-operative
security.
Co-operative security requires a set of
principles and guidelines for policy. These may be summed up as follows:
1. An increasing level and scope
of co-operation with other states in matters affecting security, especially
with the (potential and existing) adversary. It may be recalled that even
during the Cold War the two primary adversaries had instituted a significant
element of mutual co-operation to ensure strategic stability. SALT I and II,
ABM Treaty, INF Treaty, START I, the Helsinki process, and other agreements
were part of that co-operative framework.
2. Mutual and equal security of all states. This includes recognition
of not only the sovereignty of one’s own state but also acknowledges respect
for the sovereignty of potential adversary.
3. Resolution of disputes and conflicts only through peaceful means and
processes and, hence, non-use of force in international relations.
5. Contraction of the envelope of conflict and violence against states
and societies.
6. Moving (conventional and nuclear) deterrence doctrines and practice
progressively down to insurance, and reassurance.
7. Harmonisation of politico-military doctrines while adopting less
threatening and non-offensive defence concepts.
8. Institutionalised arms control and disarmament measures to reduce
military forces in co-operation with the adversary.
9. Enhanced transparency in military postures, and confidence and
security building as an integral component of state policy.
The paradigm of co-operative security would
seek national security through a co-operative framework and process which
harmonises the imperatives of one’s own security with that of the needs of the
adversary. The goal would be to decrease the threat levels rather than increase
vulnerabilities, thereby achieving security at progressively lower costs, political,
economic, and military. In the process, the principles of sovereignty of a
nation state are to be reinforced rather than questioned; but in a way that
they lead to co-operation rather than competition and conflict.